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I. The Definition of Imperfect Self-Defense Asserted by 
the State is Clearly Incorrect. 
The State incorrectly asserts that the difference between 
perfect self defense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) and 
imperfect self defense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-205(1) (c) (3) 
is as follows: 
If the actor's actual, subjective belief is 
objectively reasonable and legally justified because 
the circumstances are as he objectively and 
reasonably believes them to be, then his conduct 
would constitute a self-defense to homicide. If, on 
the other hand, his actual, subjective belief is 
objectively reasonable but is not legally justified 
because he is mistaken about the circumstances, then 
his conduct would be mitigated to manslaughter. 
Appellee's Br. at 23. In spite of the State's assertions 
that this is the "plain-language interpretation of the law," 
there is no basis in the language of these statutory 
provisions, nor in the case law, to support the State's 
assertions in this regard. 
With regards to perfect self-defense, it is has long been 
fundamental, both at common law and under Utah criminal code, 
that it does not matter at all if the defendant turns out to 
be mistaken in his belief that force is required to defend 
himself, as long as a reasonable person would have believed 
that force was necessary under the same circumstances. For 
instance, in State v. Starks, 627 P. 2d 88 (Utah 1981), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the following jury instruction 
properly stated the law governing self-defense: 
An actual danger is not necessary to establish self-
defense. If one is confronted by the appearance of 
peril which arouses in his mind, as a reasonable 
person, an honest conviction that he is about to 
suffer death or serious bodily injury, and if a 
reasonable person in a like situation, seeing and 
knowing the same facts, would be justified in 
believing himself in danger, his right to seLf 
defense is the same whether such danger is real or 
merely apparent. 
To illustrate, assume a woman living alone sees a man 
coming through her basement window in the middle of the night, 
and believing him to be a burglar, and that her life is in 
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danger, she shoots him. Later, she discovers that the man is 
her younger brother who needed a place to sleep, having been 
kicked out of their parents' house, and who came in through the 
basement window only because he did not want to wake his 
sister. If a reasonable woman in similar circumstances would 
have believed her life was in danger, then the woman is 
entitled to the complete defense of self-defense, even though 
the circumstances did not turn out to be as she had first 
perceived them. 
Yet, according to the State's interpretation of the 
statute, the woman would be entitled to a complete defense only 
if the man turned out to be an actual murderer or rapist, as 
she first perceived, and would be guilty of manslaughter if the 
man turned out to be her brother looking for a place to sleep. 
This is clearly an incorrect statement of the law. If there 
is any doubt in this regard, the plain language of the self-
defense statute provides the clear answer. The statute provides 
for a complete defense where the actor "reasonably believes" 
that force is necessary, and could easily, but does not, say 
anything at all about force being "actually necessary." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1). Clearly, the self-defense statute 
provides for a complete defense even when the circumstances do 
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not turn out to be what the actor originally believed. 
Accordingly, the State's interpretation is necessarily 
incorrect, because the State asserts that imperfect self-
defense is available only under the very same circumstances 
that constitute perfect self defense. Clearly, the imperfect 
self-defense provision of the manslaughter statute would have 
no meaning at all if it provides for mere mitigation under the 
exact same circumstances that provide a complete defense. 
II. The Only Possible Interpretation of the Imperfect 
Self-DefenseProvision Which Would Give it Some 
Rational Effect Is the One Advanced by Coonce. 
The imperfect self-defense provision provides that 
criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter where a person: 
Causes the death of another under circumstances where 
the actor reasonably believes the circumstances 
provide a legal justification or excuse for his 
conduct although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(c). As argued in Coonce's opening 
brief, the question which is raised by the plain language of 
the statute is: Under what circumstances could a person 
reasonably believe that his conduct was legally justified, when 
his conduct was not actually justified? After identifying such 
a circumstance, the question then becomes: Was the actor's 
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incorrect belief that he was entitled to a legal justification 
objectively reasonable? 
In his opening brief, Coonce assumed that there was only 
one way that a person acting in self-defense would not be 
legally justified in doing so - and that would be when his 
belief that force was necessary was not objectively reasonable. 
He then argued that the requirement of "objective 
reasonableness" under Section 76-5-205(3) would necessarily 
obliterate the mitigation of imperfect self-defense, since it 
imposes the same standard for imperfect self-defense as for 
perfect self defense. 
However, after submitting his opening brief, Coonce has 
realized that there are some other circumstances identified in 
the statute where a person might act in self-defense, but would 
not be legally justified in doing so: (1) Where some level of 
force may have been justified, but not lethal force, (2) where 
the actor was the aggressor at any time during the encounter, 
and (3) where the actor uses force while committing a felony 
or fleeing after commission of a felony. Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-
205(1) . 
In looking at each one of these additional circumstances, 
it is difficult to conceive how a person could reasonably 
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believe that he was legally justified, if in fact he was not. 
This is so because the imperfect self-defense statute requires 
that the actor must not only reasonably believe that force was 
required, but that he was entitled to a legal justification; 
in other words, the actor must reasonably believe that none of 
the exceptions set forth in the self-defense statute applied. 
For instance, if the actor used force during commission of a 
felony, he will not be entitled to assert self defense even 
though he reasonably believed that force was necessary to 
defend himself. Thus, such an actor could have reasonably 
believed that force was necessary, but would not be entitled 
to use force. Would this person fall within the definition set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(c) which provides for 
mitigation to manslaughter for a person who "[c]auses the death 
of another under circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances."? 
The answer is clearly no, because although the person may have 
believed that force was necessary, he could not have reasonably 
believed that a legal justification existed, because the legal 
justification of self defense clearly does not exist when force 
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is used during the commission of a felony.1 
A similar problem arises with regards to actors who were 
aggressors. Such actors are not entitled to a legal 
justification under the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 
(2) (a) and (c) (i) (1998) , and it is difficult to imagine how 
such an actor could reasonably believe that he was entitled to 
a legal justification since being an aggressor is intentional 
conduct and the statute clearly provides that an aggressor is 
not entitled the legal justification of self-defense. After 
all, a reasonable person is presumed to know the law, and the 
law is clear in this regard. 
Finally, a different problem arises with regards to the 
level of force required, which also makes it impossible to 
apply the imperfect self-defense provision. The self-defense 
statute provides that "a person is justified in using force 
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only 
if he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
Additionally, the legislature made it perfectly clear, 
through the felony murder provision, that such mitigation was not 
intended where force is used during the commission of a felony. 
For instance, a bank robber might reasonably believe that his 
life is in danger when the police arrive with their weapons 
drawn, but he is not entitled have a criminal homicide charge 
mitigated to manslaughter if he uses force under those 
circumstances. 
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person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful 
force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." 
Accordingly, if the person's belief that a certain level of 
force is required is objectively reasonable, then the person 
will be entitled to the complete defense. See U.C.A. § 76-2-
4 02(1). In other words, the only way the actor would not be 
entitled to a complete defense, and thus need to rely on the 
manslaughter statute, would be if his belief regarding the 
level of force necessary was not objectively reasonable. Thus, 
the language of the imperfect self-defense provision, requiring 
that the actor's belief that he was entitled to a legal 
justification be objectively reasonable, again obliterates the 
defense of imperfect self-defense by apparently imposing the 
same standard for imperfect self defense as for imperfect self-
defense, which could not possibly have been intended by the 
Utah Legislature. 
Clearly, there is simply no logical interpretation of the 
plain language of Section 76-5-205(1) (c) , other than the 
interpretation asserted by Coonce in his opening brief, that 
would preserve the obvious intent of the legislature to provide 
for mitigation where a person uses force in circumstances akin 
to self-defense, but short of the standard imposed for a 
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complete defense.2 
Accordingly, as Coonce asserts in his opening brief, this 
Court should adopt the only reasonable interpretation of the 
statute, grounded in the historical concept of imperfect self-
defense, which is that a person who kills another because he 
actually believes that his own life is in danger, even though 
that belief is not objectively reasonable, is guilty of 
manslaughter, and not murder. 
Ill. The Misunderstanding of the Law by Coonce's 
Counsel Did Not Constitute "Invited Error" by 
Coonce 
The State asserts that this Court should not review 
Coonce's claims on appeal based on the doctrine of "invited 
error." Under this doctrine, appellate courts decline to 
review on appeal "prejudicial error which was affirmatively, 
legislative records do not provide an answer to this 
puzzle. During the amendment process, the lawmakers merely and 
very briefly mentioned what is clear from the face of the 
amendment; that is, that the lawmakers intended that the factors 
which would convert criminal homicide to manslaughter should be 
evaluated from an objective standard, rather than a subjective 
standard. Utah State Senate, 46th Legislative Session, Senate 
Bill 127, Feb. 5 and 6, 1985. 
Counsel would venture to guess that the legislature intended 
to impose the "objectively reasonable standard" onto the "extreme 
emotional distress" provision of the manslaughter statute, which 
is workable and supported in the case law, and extended the 
standard to the imperfect self-defense provision without 
realizing that such a standard would obliterate the mitigation 
defense the legislature was trying to preserve or create. 
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knowingly, and intentionally waived . . . . " State v. Day, 815 
P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991). This doctrine prevents a defendant 
in a criminal case from intentionally "inviting" prejudicial 
error as a form of "appellate insurance" against an adverse 
sentence. Id. 
Cases in which the doctrine has been applied usually 
involve knowing conduct by an attorney on the defendant's 
behalf. For instance, in Day, the attorney was aware that 
there had been some communication between a jury member and a 
witness, but did not bring this to the court's attention until 
after the verdict had been returned. Likewise, in State v. 
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287 (Utah App. 1994), defense counsel 
omitted non-marriage from his own jury instruction on rape, and 
later, on appeal, asserted that the commission was plain error. 
In the instant case, it can hardly be asserted that 
defense counsel intentionally misstated the fundamental law of 
the case, and repeatedly made inconsistent statement regarding 
the law of the case, as a form of appellate insurance. In fact, 
defense counsel did not even know which version of the statute 
applied to the case until after the trial started. (R. 388, 
p. 22-23, R. 389, p. 473-474:14-16). Clearly, this is not a 
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case where defense counsel, or Coonce, "affirmatively, 
knowingly, and intentionally," waived anything. In fact, as 
asserted by Coonce in his opening brief, his defense counsel's 
deficiencies constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Accordingly, it would be fundamentally unfair to deprive Coonce 
of appellate review under the plain error doctrine. 
IV. Coonce Properly Marshaled the Evidence in Support of 
the Verdict. 
Coonce concedes that, since he made an argument based on 
insufficiency of evidence, it was his obligation to Marshall 
the evidence in support of the verdict. In fact, as set forth 
below, Coonce did exactly that in his opening brief. 
The State incorrectly asserts that Coonce cited "only the 
evidence that supports the result he would have liked the court 
to reach. . .[and] ignore[d] other critical evidence that 
plainly supported the trial court's verdict." Appellant's Br. 
at 18. To the contrary, Coonce provided an exhaustive overview 
of the evidence that supported the verdict. 
The State also argues that Coonce failed to mention 
certain evidence in support of the verdict, specifically, (1) 
that Coonce's hand was on the gun when Charles turned to him, 
(2) the palms-up gesture that Charles made as he was saying 
"What are you going to do, shoot me?", (3) that Coonce shot 
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Charles seven times, (4) that Coonce "continued pumping bullets 
into Charles after the victim was on the ground, dead," (5) 
that Coonce fled the scene, (6) that Coonce knew the gun was 
loaded, and (7) that Charles was unarmed. 
In fact, Coonce did mention the evidence regarding most of 
these issues in his brief. For example, Coonce mentioned that 
he had the gun in his waistband as he headed up the stairs, 
Appellant's Br. At 7, and that he had his hand on the gun as 
he headed up the stairs, Appellant's Br. at 9, and that Charles 
saw his hand on the gun just prior to saying, "What are you 
going to do, shoot me?" 
With regards to Coonce's flight from the scene, Coonce 
denies that this evidence supports the verdict. Although 
evidence of flight may be relevant to whether the actor 
actually did the criminal act, "evidence of flight or 
concealment of a crime does not support an inference of 
intentional conduct on the part of the accused." State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781. (Utah 1991). In other words, if Coonce 
denied he did the shooting at all (e.g. if there were no 
witnesses), his flight from the scene would raise an inference 
that he did indeed do the act. But where, as here, he does not 
deny he did the shooting, but merely asserts that the 
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circumstances surrounding the shooting warrant mitigation to 
manslaughter, evidence of his flight can not raise an inference 
regarding his mental state. 
With regards to the palms-up gesture made by Coonce, 
Coonce did not include the gesture because its meaning is 
completely ambiguous from the record, and the trial court did 
not make any findings about the meaning of the gesture. And 
while the State describes the gesture as one of "clear 
vulnerability," it could just as well be described as one of 
hostility or aggression, since this palms-up gesture is 
commonly used by male adolescents along with statements like 
"What are you gonna do about it?" At any rate, since there is 
no information in the record about the meaning of the gesture, 
it does not support the verdict. 
With regards to the evidence showing that Coonce knew the 
gun was loaded, Coonce conceded in his opening brief that the 
killing was intentional. Thus, it can clearly be presumed that 
he knew the gun was loaded. With regards to the fact that 
Charles was unarmed, Coonce never insinuated that Charles was 
armed. Thus, it simply was not an issue. Finally, with 
regards to the number of shots fired, Coonce inadvertently 
omitted the exact number of shots fired, but acknowledged that 
13 
it was several. Appellant's Br. at 10. 
Finally, in support of its claim that Coonce failed to 
Marshall the evidence, the State repeatedly argues that Coonce 
failed to mention the various inference that might reasonably 
be drawn from the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to 
the verdict. Yet, the State cites no rule, and the Appellant 
knows of none, which requires Coonce to not only Marshall the 
evidence, but also to argue all inferences which would support 
the verdict. While the court is required to view the evidence, 
and all reasonable inferences that arise therefrom, in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, State v. Silva, 2000 UT 
App 292, 1 13, 13 P.3d 604 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted), Coonce is required to show "that the evidence to 
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust," Id. 
In sum, Coonce properly marshaled all of the evidence in 
support of the verdict, and properly argued that the evidence 
was so unconvincing that the verdict was unreasonable. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Coonce respectfully asserts that 
the evidence did not support his conviction for criminal 
homicide, and that he was deprived of a fair trial by the 
errors of his counsel and the misunderstanding of the law 
governing his case by both the trial court and his defense 
counsel. On that basis, he respectfully requests that his 
conviction be vacated. 
DATED this )& day of July, 2001. 
CANDICE JOHN 
Attorney for Michael Coonce 
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